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FREEDOM OF SPEECH UNDER OUR CONSTITUTIONS*

By ABRAHAM Pn-sKy*

At the outset of this inquiry, we deem it noteworthy to call attention to the fact that reveals itself to the investigator: The cases
involving the right of freedom of speech arise, with astonishing
frequency, in times of industrial and political strife as compared
to the almost complete absence of litigation upon this matter in
normal times; and it is pertinent at this point to observe that these
normal times greatly exceed, numerically, the abnormal times of
industrial and political strife. Hence, for the purposes of this
discussion, it is advisable to conduct our inquiry with regard to
the scope of this right in peacetime and in war.
We may safely state that freedom of speech includes written as
well as verbal utterances for the distinction between liberty of
the press and freedom of speech, so-called, is merely formal. It is
necessary to assume that the scope of this inquiry must not be
limited to a particular phase, but should include, so far as possible,
all aspects of the subject with particular emphasis upon its
origin, development and present status.
If possible, it would be enlightening to define freedom of speech,
but definition is impracticable as an absolute conception of it is
impossible, for freedom of speech is not an absolute and unchanging thing.
The nearly, if not quite unanimous expressed view, of our judges
has always been, and is, that our constitutional declarations of
*The James F. Brown Prize Thezis, 1924-25. In 1919 the late James F. Brown,
of the class of 1873, gave $5,000.00 to the University to be invested by it and the
income used as a prite for the best essay each year on the subject of the individual
Any senior or any
liberties of the citizen as guaranteed by our constitutions.
graduate of any College of the University, within one year after receiving his
bachelor's degree, may compete for this prize.
**LL. B., West Virginia University, 1925, Bellaire, Ohio.
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liberty of the press and freedom of speech are declaratory, only,
of the English common law rights protected by the English courts
at the time of our Revolution, as, for example, the declaration of
the right of trial by jury, and are not expansive of that right or
creative of a new right unknown to the English common law.
The most eminent of the early advocates of the right of free
speech, John Milton, in his "Areopagiticia," eloquently argues
for the right of free discussion of all events, although he is very
careful to make it clear that the principles which he contends for
so vigorously, have no application to Papists. In the same manner, Thomas Erskine, the leader of the English Bar in his time,
would pause, in the midst of his glowing periods in eulogy of the
right of free speech, to express his entire approval of the denial
of that right to religious heretics.1 In view of such statenaents,
at the bar, on the bench and in Parliament, it is rather surprising
that we find no mention of such right in the Petition of Right
(1628), or the Bill of Rights (1689), the two great English Constitutional documents that are direct forerunners of our own Bill
of Rights. This corrects an erroneous impression, even among
lawyers, that the right of free discussion was one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen.2
It is true that English judges have spoken, not infrequently, of
the freedom of speech as a recognized, though restricted right,
and famous statesmen and brilliant publicists, have from time to
'time, during the long struggle for English lilerty, eulogized the
right of free discussion as the palladium of their rights and the
greatest engine of public safety ;3 yet, in fact, until comparatively
recent times, the right of free discussion so far from being free
was very narrowly restricted.
At the time of the American Revolution, the English common
law divided unlawful publications into four species of libels:
First; There were defamatory libels or publications defamatory
of existing personal or professional reputations. Second; Seditious libel or publications defamatory of existing public officers,
government institutions and law. Third; Blasphemous libels or
publications defamatory of the Christian religion. Fourth; Obscene and immoral libels or publications defamatory of England's
existing standard of public morality. If a given publication did
not encounter one of these four species of libel, then it was lawful,
in exercise of the right of liberty of the press. By that negative
1

70 CENTURY LAW JOURNAL 189.
DicEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION,

4th ed.
' Rex v. Petier, 78 State Trials 529 (1803).
I
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process, of inclusion and exclusion, the sphere of liberty of the
press was outlined.
This classification arose from the administration of publications
of the press from the very tim that the mechanical device of printing was introduced into England, during the reign of Henry
VII. It seems to have been taken for granted that the press
could be used only by license of the King.' The granting of
such license, which was continued through succeeding reigns, was
probably, at first, intended more as a means of securing a monopoly
to the licensee than a device of censorship. But, in the time of
Elizabeth, the practice of using the license as a means of controlling the character of publication had become firmly rooted.
During the reign of James I, the Star Chamber had taken over the
regulation of the press, and true to its evil genius, had soon
developed it into a very effective engine of oppression. With the
fall of the Star Chamber in 1641, Parliament took over the press
censorship, but the restraints, imposed upon all publications, were
scarcely less oppressive after the Revolution of 1688. These regulations gradually fell into disuse, probably because of the decrease
of illiteracy and the increase of printing devices, which naturally
made the task of censorship a more difficult one. After the expiration of the last licensing act, in 1694, it was never renewed.'
Even, after one had become free to print what he would without license, one remained fully liable, in civil action or criminal
prosecution, for any wrong committed in the exercise of this
freedom, so-called. To use the language of Lord Kenyon, "The
liberty of the press is, neither more nor less than this, that a
man may publish anything which twelve of his countrymen think
is not blamable, but that he ought to be punished if he publishes
that which is blamable." '
However, there were certain set standards which the common
law provided in determining whether or not the publication fell
into the four species of libel hereinbefore enumerated. Lord
Mansfield laid it down clearly that the English common law test,
to be applied to determine the seditious character of political
publication was as follows: Was their tendency as opinion makers
to create and diffuse among the people, ill opinion of existing
public officials, governmental institutions and laws? The same
rule governed publications of religion. Would it be their tendency
4 PATTERSON, LIBERTY OF PRESS AND SPEECH 44.

.
7
8

Id. 46.
Rex v. Cuthell, 27 State Trials 641 (1799).
Rex x. Chambers, 3 State Trials 561 (1629).
Rex v. Prynne, 3 State Trials 561 (1632).
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to create and diffuse among the people an ill opinion of existing
standards of morality? Again, publications were unlawful if their
tendency was to create and diffuse amrong the people an ill opinion
of the personal or professional reputation of the person referred
to, though here it seems that the actual objective tendency, as a
matter of fact, was more emphasized and more important thaAl in
the other cases of seditious, blasphemous and obscene or immoral
libel, where the supposed tendency as a matter of abstract subjective speculations, seems to have been the controlling and decisive
factor.
It should be observed that, as a rule, the freedom of discussion
and liberty of the press have been restricted only in respect to
matters in which the government has been concerned on its own
account. Yet the manner is surprising, in which the courts interpreted the extent and operations of this governmental interest.
Thus, in 1629, a merchant was tried before the Star Chamber
for saying that "a merchant was more screwed and wrung in
England than in Turkey." He was found guilty of sedition,
since his utterance tended to cast dishonor upon the King's government, certainly, to the court's manner of thinking, a very important governmental interest. In the time of the Stuarts, the
subservient judges carried this doctrine to the extremes in response to orders from their royal masters, and an unfortunate
author of a book attacking the stage, which was then under the
patronage of the King, was indicted and convicted for seditious
libel, for stating that "dancing was the devil's profession, and
fiddlers were the minstrels of the devil." The presiding judge
decided that this was a seditious libel, so wicked in character
that it made his blood boil.
Another restriction at common law upon the freedom of discussion and liberty of the press, closely related to the crime of blasphemy, was that of making an immoral or obscene publication.
This crime, originating in the decisions of the ecclesiastical courts
grew vigorously under the ministrations of the iniquitous Star
Chamber, and came subsequently to be recognized in Westminster
Hall as a crime. As late as 1765, Wilkes was indicted and convicted for the publication of his "Essay on Woman," which was
deemed so indecent as to be an offense at common law. 9 It is
submitted, in the light of these decisions, that obscenity in speech
and in the press was a common law crime, notwithstanding the
assertion made by that eminent authority, Schroeder, that, "ob.
9 Rex v. Wflkes, 4 Burr. 2527 (1770).
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seenity merely as such, (that is, dissociated from blasphemy and
sedition or a tendency to provoke a breach of the peace in private
revenge) was not punishable at common law, and, at the adoption
of our federal constitution and Bill of Rights and prior thereto,
the circulation of such matter was a part of the freedom of the
press, although such freedom was only a matter of permission.' "0
Closely akin to the crime of seditious libel at common law, was
that of blasphemy which constituted a denial of the tenets of
the established religion, or a criticism of the practices or the
prelates of the established church. The common law attitude
toward religious discussion is well represented by the statement
of Hale, Judge, "to say that religion is a cheat is to dissolve all
In
those obligations whereby civil societies are preserved.""
the time of Elizabeth, any criticism, whatever, of the established
church was deemed, ipso facto, an attempt to subvert the government. The obvious reason of this harsh rule was that at this time
the church and state were one. Hence any attack upon the church
was, by its very nature, an attack on the sovereign. It follows from
this premise that under our own government, where the church
and state have always been regarded as being separate, any conviction for blasphemy must be justified on the ground that the
utterance, which at common law would amount to blasphemy, must
now fall within the scope of utterances or discussions which directly tend to a breach of the peace. Quaere: Would a verbal or written attack on any branch of the federal or state government, for
example, on a federal or state educational institution, amount to
seditious libel if the common law rule be followed?
According to the common law standard, a man is not free to
mike false statements injuring the reputation of another, though
made with good intentions. There were, however, certain relations
in which communications of information were so essential to the
public welfare that certain exceptions arose to qualify the operation and extent of this rule. In some instances, public polity
so clearly demanded immunity for utterances that the law would
not allow one to be drawn into question at all, as for instance,
statements made in Parliament or by a judge on the bench.
Such statements were said to be absolutely privileged. In other
relations, where the public interests were less deeply involved,
communications were subject to what was said to be only a
qualified privilege. This doctrine of qualified privilege was the
subject and center of the fiercest battles that raged about freedom
30 SC HROEDER,

'OBSCMNMIY

12 Regina v. Taylor,

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL

1 Ventres 293 (1687).

LAW."
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of speech, and it should be noticed that these controversies involved, in the main, an attempt on part of the courts to define the
right of free speech.
The English rule forming the basis of judicial decisions in
cases involving freedom of discussion and liberty of the press
up until the American Revolution is well stated by Blackstone,
writing some twenty years before the adoption of our own Constitution. He writes that, "the freedom of press consists in laying
no previous restraintsupon publication, and not in freedom from
censure for criminal matter when published. . . .To subject the
press to the restrictive power of the licensor, as formerly done,
both before and since the Revolution (of 1688), is to subject all
freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him
the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in
learning, religion, and government."' 12 It appears to the writer
that Blackstone has expounded with astonishing precision and
foresight the rule that has been adhered to (and rightfully) from
3
the earliest American decisions to our present day.1
It is now necessary to consider briefly the status of freedom of
speech and liberty of the press in the American colonies prior
to the American Revolution as throwing light upon the question
of what was the right which the first amendinent of the constitution of the United States declared should not be abridged. When
the colonists first cane to this country, they brought over with
them the prevailing English views as to restrictions upon freedom
of public discussion, which were in no-wise lessened, we think, in
the severe minds of the Puritans of New England and in the
royalists' policies of the Cavaliers of Virginia. That stout royalist, Governor Berkley of Virginia, had no intention of permitting
the common people to concern themselves with affairs of state.
We find him, in 1681, thanking God "there are no free schools or
printing; and I hope we shall not have these one hundred years
hence, for learning has brought disobedience and heresy and
sects into this world, and printing has divulged them. Libels
against the best governments have resulted. God keep us from
both."1 4 This desire, expressed by Berkley, was well followed in
practice for we see a strict censorship of the press in Massachusetts,
Virginia, New York and in the other colonies. In Virginia, the
unlicensed publisher of the Virginia laws was arrested, and held
under bond until the pleasure of the King could be made known.
12 BLACKSTONE'8 COMMENTARIES. Vol. 4. 51.
= 32 HIAivtvpD LAw Rvmw 932.
14 WATSON, CONSTITUTIONS, Vol. 2, p. 1400.
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The King promptly forbade the further publication of such laws.,
In fact, the requirement of a previous license for publication per.sisted in Massachusetts more than a score of years longer than in
England, having been abolished only in 1719.6
The famous Bill of Rights prepared by George Mason for the
Virginia constitution in 1776, appears to have been the first constitutional document recognizing the right of freedom. of the press
and free speech in this country. Others of the new states gave
recognition in their constitutions to this right, but when the
federal constitutional convention met in 1787, the proposal, made
at different times by Mr. Pinckney that the new constitution should
include a guaranty of liberty of the press and freedom of speech,
received little attention, and was not inserted in the Constitution as finally submitted for ratification.17
The first Amendment, in the form in which it was adopted,
was drawn up by the first Congress, at the request of the legislatures of the several states. Indeed, it is worth noting that when
the Constitutional Convention met, it was still strongly affected
with the English idea that it was contrary to the public welfare
that the debates and proceedings should be communicated to the
public. Hence the convention sat behind closed doors, and all
its members were enjoined to hold the proceedings secret. Even
after the establishment of the new government, the Senate, for
several years, refused to open its doors to the public, or allow publication of its debates.' s Compare this with the utmost liberality
in contemporary procedure of the English Parliament, where
newspapers were allowed to print reports daily, although there
was an unrepealed statute to the effect that reports of Parliament's
proceedings could not be made public without a previous license.
Perhaps, this observation will demonstrate that the founders of
our government were conscious of the evils that would result from
an unrestrained press and an uncontrolled tongue. It seems
strange that the founders of the American nation should have
adopted an oppressive rule at the outset in respect to freedom of
discussion, when the motive for founding the new nation was the
desire to accord to the inhabitants of the colonies a more liberal
government than that of England.
Yet this affords an excellent contradiction to those who maintain
that the minds of the founders of our government were minds
embittered at everything English, including the English common
yIDETH, HISTORY or U. S., 561.
H-LVARD L&w REmVw 379.
IT wATSON, CONSTITUTIONS, Vol. 2, l. 1401.
515.
1 COOLEY, CONSTrTUTIONAL Ln5uT&TIoNs,
25

S4
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law of freedom of speech and press and governmental institutions.
In the light of the foregoing statements, and of the brief survey
of the development of the common law right of freedom of speech
and the press, what was in the mind of those in Congress who
drafted the First Amendment, submitted by the legislatures of the
states, when they ratified it in this form. "Congress shall make
no law ......
.abridging
-the freedom of speech or of the
press." Was the right of a free press, thus guaranteed, merely
exemption from the requirement of license previous to publication-the Blackstonian theory-with such liability from the publication as existed by common law rules, or might be imposed by
statute, or was it intended, by this provision, to protect a right
not only to publication without license but also immunity from
prosecutions of the vexatious and oppressive sort that had so outraged the lovers of freedom both in England and in the Colonies
during the preceding century? The writer maintains that the purpose of the First Amendment was merely declaratory of Blackstone's view-previous restraint being the only thing abolishedand the American courts, with very few exceptions, have adopted
and supported this Blackstonian doctrine.
Typical examples of the constitutional provisions found in
state constitutions guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the
press are those of Virginia and West Virginia. The Virginia
Constitution states that, "any citizen may speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects being responsible for the abuse
of that liberty.."' 9 The Constitution of West Virginia provides,
"no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press shall be
passed. But the legislature may, by suitable penalties, restra'n the
publication or sale of obscene books, papers or pictures, and
provide for the punishment of libel and defamation of character
and for the recovery in civil actions, by the aggrieved party, of
suitable damages for such libel or defamation."120 Thus we can
safely state that the state constitutions expressly adopted the
rule as pronlulgated by Blackstone. which was impliedly, stated
in the briefer form of the federal constitution.
President Green of the West Virginia Supreme Court, speaking in 1878, well stated that, "the proper signification of these
phrases is, if so understood, misapprehended. The 'liberty of the
press' consists in a right in the conductor of a newspaper to
print whatever he chooses without any previous license, but subject
to be held responsible therefor to exactly the same extent that
19 CONSTITUTIONS OF VIRGINIA, ART I, § 7.
wEST vntwiRA CONSTITUTION, ART. In, §

7.
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anyone else would be responsible for such publication."121 The
Virginia courts adopt the same judicial interpretation of their
constitutional rights on this point. 22 Story 2 and Kent,24 our own
two great American commentators, hold in accord.
However, we have Judge Cooley voicing a vigorous dissent to
the Blackstonian doctrine. "We understand liberty of speech and
of the press to imply, not only the liberty to publish, but complete immunity from legal censure and punishment for the publication, so long as it is not harmful in its character when tested
by such standards as the law affords. For these standards we
must look to the common law rules when the constitutional guarantees were established, and in reference to which they have been
adopted." 25 He further asserts that to follow Blackstone's theory
of interpretation to a logical conclusion, the liberty of the press
and freedom of speech might be rendered a "mockery and delusion," since the legislators could, with impunity, after securing
the individual's right to publish anything he desired without
restraint, impose any limitation they so desired, and be within
the power conferred.
It is not difficult for one to see the dangers suggested by
Cooley, even in jurisdictions which have expressly adopted the
English common law as a basis for judicial decision. It is provided in the West Virginia Code that the common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to the principle of the constitution of West Virginia, shall continue in force within the same,
except in those respects wherein it was altered by the General
Assembly of Virginia, before the 20th day of June, 1863, or 7zs
been or sall be altered by the Legislature of the State of West
2
Virginia. 6
The West Virginia Supreme Court has held, in interpreting this
statute, that the Common Law of England is in force in this
State, only so far as it is in harmony with its institutions and
its principles applicable to the conditions of the State and of
society.2 7 Two questions present themselves at once: (1) Is
there anything to be gained, by adopting Cooley's theory of complete imilunity from legal censure for publications and utterances
so long as not harmful in their character, tested by common law
standards, when the legislature, in a state having already adopted
m Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 158 (1878).
Williamt Printing Company, et aZ v Sanders, 113 Va. 156 at 178 (1912).
STORY'S

COMMENTARIES,

Vol.

3,

KENT'S COMMENTARIES, Vol. 3,

§

K

32.

24.

COOLEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 518.
BARNES' CODE OF WEST VIRGINIA, Chap. 6.

§ 5.
27 Powell v. Simms, 5 W. Va. 1, 73 S. E. 472 (1912).
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the Common Law as its basis, can, with impunity, repeal at will
these common law standards, suggested by Cooley, with the sanction of the statute? (2) Oannot these set common law standards
be modified, qualified and aitered into any shape the legislature
deems advisable and if so what safer means does Cooley offer?
It is well to remember that before destruction of existing institutions (Blackstonian Theory) one must be ready to supply better
methods than those sought to be destroyed. That is the true
test of progress.
An eminent authority on freedom of speech and liberty of
the press28 states that England repudiated the Blackstonian Theory
by adopting Fox's Libel Act in 1792,29 and in the light of this
statement, he further asserts that we, in America, have likewise
repudiated the Commentator's theory. However, it is suggested
that the Common Law of England only as it existed at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution is the basic law of our nation
and certainly any statute enacted by the English Parliament
after the separation of the two nations is of no more binding
consequence than to serve as a mere suggestion to our own legislatures. We have it from good authority that the scope of the
operation of Fox's Libel Act was curtailed to a great degree
shortly after its enactment on account of the dangerous anarchistic
ideas that were prevalent at that time-the period of the French
30
Revolution.
The Sedition Act passed in July, 1798, by Congress was an outgrowth of the Federalist plan to provide a more adequate army
and navy and in the main to check the utterances of the many
alien journalists who were free, to the point of scurrility, in their
criticisms of the Administration and their approval of the most
abhorrent features of the French Revolution. 31 The question of
the constitutionality of this Act never came before the United
States Supreme Court, but was upheld in the lower federal courts.
This Act, although later repealed, was justifiable on the grounds
that it was necessary to prevent the dissemination of the French
Terroristic ideals which would strike "perilously near the roots
of our government, then in its tre3mbling infancy." The charges
made by historians, that this Act was infamous and unconstitutional, as its sole purpose was the destruction of the Anti Federalist party, appear to be ill advised. A person living in the recent
decade can find a very striking analogy in the attitude of the
0

CnArFEE, FREEDOM

OF SPEECH.

32 GEORGr III, Chap. 60.

31 GREENE, HISTORY OF ENGLISH PEOPLE, 317.
a' AcT I, STATUTES AT LARGO, 596.
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United States Government in 1920
when
the
Government felt it necessary to place a ban upon Bolshvistic agitators.
The action of the Government, both in 1798 and in 1920, was the
result of the nation's fear for its own safety if radicals and radical
ideas were allowed free sway.
It was not until after Alexander Hamilton's eloquence in the
case of People v. Groswell,"2 decided in 1804, that the Legislature
of New York passed a statute embodying the principles contended
for by Hamilton:--The truth may be offered in evidence on a
charge for libel or slander. The jury is the judge of both the
law and the facts of the case. The constitutions of many of the
states contain the same provision as that of New York. West
Virginia allows truth to be pleaded in justification. 3
The courts have eclipsed Hamilton in their eagerness to extend
the guaranties of the Constitution. When liberty of speech and
press meant right to publish, with impunity, truth on matters
of public concern without reference to motive or justifiable ends,
Hamilton extended the right to matters of private concern and
attached to the restraint "truth" the qualifications--"with good
motives for justifiable ends." The judges have struck out the word
"truth" and have substituted in its stead this statement-' 'falsehood in the honest belief that it is the truth," -and have attached
to the substitute, Hamilton's qualifications-"with good motives
for justifiable ends' -thus obtaining the result-'liberty of the
press and freedom of speech is a privilege to publish with impunity a falsehood on matters of public concern in the honest belief that it is a true statement with good motives for justifiable
ends." This judge made liberty of the press, in the ordinary law
of libel to publish defamatory fasehood on matters of public concern, is consistent with and perhaps necessitated by, the other
judicial view that the constitutional declarations in the original,
and the Hamiltonian form only prohibit previous censorship. The
declarations differ only in their formal statement, not in their
scope.
The constitutional provisions regarding free speech and liberty
of the press forbid the abridgment of these two rights. By implication the enlargement of these two rights is not forbidden and
judicial legislation enlarging the privilege to speak and publish
defamatory falsehood, enlarges these rights emancipating them
from the restraining of the truth. Such judicial action is within
People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. 337 (N. Y. 1804).
WEST VInGn4IA CONSTrruTIOn, ART. III, § 2.
WISCONSIN SESSION LAws 1923, Chap. 39.
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the meaning and spirit of the constitutions. Quaere: To what
extent can the courts and legislatures, in view of this interpretation of the First Amendment, enlarge the freedom of speech and
liberty of the Press? In the opinion of the writer, such enlargement will be sanctioned to the point only where other constitutional guaranties are not infringed, for example, the taking of
property without due process of law.
Suppose a statute is passed under one of these constitutional
guaranties of freedom of discussion whereby it is made unlawful
to withhold income tax returns from the public. Suppose such
statute were in operation and returns were about to be divulged
which act a taxpayer seeks to restrain; then would the constitutionality of this statute be upheld on the "enlargement" interpretation of the constitutional guaranties or would the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment apply? In Wisconsin, practically the same statute was enacted, as here suggested, and the
same situation arose. The upper court rejected the argument
based on the due process clause, placing their decision on the
ground that no injury had been shown."5 It seems that the
conflict of the two constitutional guaranties was avoided in this
decision as-the court found an easier way out of this troublesome
situation. The enlargement interpretation theory affords great potentialities which may be the field of bitter controversy.
The Texas legislature, by virtue of the enlargement interpretation, as stated, provided: "It is no offense to make true statements of fact or express opinion as to the integrity or other qualifications .of a candidate for any office or public place or appointment. "31
Georgia, likewise, has adopted substantially the same
provision in its code.3 7 It is easily to be seen that the liberty
afforded by these statutory provisions may deprive one of his property, without due process of law.
The question, in every case, is whether opinions and inferences
are not stated as such, but as facts. It is to be observed, moreover, that although comment, however expressed, is opinion or
inference, it mnay be stated in terms of fact, and as such, it is
within the immunity of fair comment so long as it appears to be
a permissible deduction or conclusion from other facts truthfully
stated. There is a fundamental distinction between comment upon
given facts and the direct assertion of facts. In view of the fact
that many of the state constitutional provisions concerning the
'

Juneau v. Wisconsin Tax Commisslon, 199 N. W. 63 (Wiso. 1924).
TExAs PENAL CODE, ARr. 630.

87 GEORGIA CMIL CODE, Par. 6.
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freedom of the press refer only to the expression of "sentiments,"
or "opinions," the distinctions between comment and statement
of fact may involve constitutional questions of vital importance.
It is true that when one becomes a candidate for public honors,
he makes a property of himself for public investigation. All his
pretensions become the proper subject of inquiry and discussion.
He makes himself a species of public property into the qualities
of which, every one has a righit to pry and give his opinion. The
ordeal of public scrutiny is many times a disagreeable and p~inful
operation. But the publication of falsehood and calumny against
the public officers or candidates for public offices is an offense
most dangerous to the people, and deserves punishment, because
the people may be deceived and reject the best citizens to their
great injury and to the injury of the state 3 8 Consequently, a state
should guard closely the extension of the liberty of the press and
freedom of speech, even though it has a constitutional right to do
so under the "enlargement" interpretation.
Another interpretation of these constitutional guarantees is that
they only protect the citizen from suffering legal consequences at
the hands of the governmental authorities, acting in the alleged enforcement of the law. The constitutional guarantees do not and cannot protect the citizen against the social consequences of exercising
his legal privilege, to say that which he pleases. As one author puts
it, "every citizen of the United States has the right to bray like
an ass if he wishes, but he need not expect the United States constitution to protect him from the unpleasant social consequences
of being regarded as an ass.' '3 Cases have arisen in which
members of an association, such as the bar or ntedical societies
have been expelled from membership, for certain utterances
deemed to be of such a character as to render the expellee unworthy of affiliation with the association.4 The courts have refused legal aid to compel reinstatement of the expellee. The
courts in so refusing, necessarily must have based their decisions
on the grounds that the constitution will protect one against legal
punishment, but it cannot protect one from social ostracism, for the
unwise use of language. It can be easily seen that one in being
deprived of social connections, as the legal and medical societies
are designated, can at the same time be deprived of pursuing his
vocation. It is suggested that this interpretation, perhaps, draws
an unnecessary dividing line between one's legal rights, as guaranE3 Sweeney v. Baker supra.

0o 2 MINNESOTA LAW kmrnxw 239 (1918).
to Barry v. Players, 130 N. Y. S. 701 (1911); People
18, 95 N. E. 995 (1911).
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teed by the constitutional provision on freedom of speech
and one's social rights, especially in so far as it affects one's right
to a livelihood.
The comparatively recent development of the motion picture
industry has given rise to a newv problem in regard to whether
or not the constitutional guarantees of the First Amendment of
the federal constitution and similar provisions of the state constitution extend to that industry. A series of these cases decided
that the constitutional guarantees did not extend to give protection against interferance with the exhibition of productions of
this industry."' It was contended in these cases that the statute
providing for censorship was violative of the constitutional guarantees, on the grounds that an exhibition of films is assimilated to
the freedom of speech, writing and publications assured by the
constitution, and for the abuse of which only, is there responsibility. It was insisted that as no law may be passed to restrain the
liberty of the press or freedom of speech, no law could be passed
to subject motion pictures to censorship before their public exhibition. Justice McKenna very well said, "the first impulse of the
nind is to reject the contention. The argument is wrong or strained which extends the guaranties of free opinion and speech to the
multitudinous shows which are advertised on the bill boards of
our cities and towns, and which regards them as emblems of
public safety, to use the words of Lord Camden, and which seeks
to bring the motion pictures and other spectacles, into practical
and legal sinilitude to a free press and liberty of opinion. It
cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving pictures
is a business pure and simple, originated and conducted for
profit like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to
be regarded by the constitution (of the state in question) as a part
of the press, or as organs of public opinion. They are mere representations of events, of ideas and sentiments published and
known, vivid, useful and entertaining no doubt, but as we have
because of
said, capable of evil, having power for it, the greater
'42
their attractiveness and manner of exhibition."
Justice McKenna declared the law in these cases with a maximum
of foresight as one is now enabled to see, when we consider the
potentialities for evil of an uncensored motion picture industry.
It is interesting to compare the reasoning, of MeKenna with the
reasoning in the decision of the English court in 1632, which held
" Mutual
trial Comm.
Kansas 236
2
tual

Film Co. v. Chicago, 224 Fed. 101 (1915); Mutual Film Co. v. Indusof Ohio, 236 U. S. 230 (1915); Mutual Film Co. v. Hodgo, Gov. of
U. S. 248 (1915).
Film Co. v. Industrial Comm- of Ohio, supra.
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that governmental interest included the stage. It is submitted
that the motion picture case could well have been decided on the
dicta appearing in the ease; "they are capable of evil, having
power for it, the greater because of their attractiveness and manner
of exhibition." In other words, their exhibition could be restricted as an act tending to a breach of the peace, an interpretation
known as the theory of indirect causation.
There is an interesting question in regard to whether or not
the exclusion of printed matter from the mails by the postal
authorities under governmental sanction amounts to an abridgement of the liberty of the press under our constitution. The
United States Supreme Court has decided the question in the
negative. The contention that the denial of postal facilities is
tantamount to a denial of the right of publication was first voiced
by Calhoun, but the court has found to the contrary. In excluding various articles from the mails, the object of Congress has
not been to interfere with the freedom of the press, or with any
other rights of the people, but to refuse its facilities for the distribution of matter deemed injurious to public morals.4 3 In short,
the use of the mails is to an extent, at least, a revocable privilege,
and may be subjected to reasonable conditions.
The postal system is the only means of communication between
distant points since competing systems are forbidden. The result is, notwithstanding, the decision of the courts, which impliedly
state that there are other means of transmission of the forbidden
printed matter which one can use without restriction, that the
exclusion of publications from the mails is actually a restraint on
the liberty of the press. The postal system provided by the government is the only practical means of disseminating ideas in
printed form. Thus the exclusion from the mails prevents such
dissemination, and results in a most effective curtailment of the
right to free discussion. However, this privilege of exclusion has
been most judiciously exercised in the past, hence no harm has
resulted from this mere technical invasion of our constitutional
guaranty.
The common law did not permit one to write or speak anything
that would corrupt or interfere with the administration of justice.
Therefore, any publication imputing misconduct to a judge was
an indictable offense. The right of every court to prntect itself
in the discharge of its functions by contempt proceedings has
long been recognized as an inherent right of every court, a right
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 733 (1877).
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without which the administration of justice would be a farce. It
may be stated as a proposition of law that this power is unquestioned and unquestionable, and the courts can exercise it in summary proceedings. As an essential element and part of the court
itself, it cannot be taken away without impairing the usefulness
and virilty of the court. It is undoubtedly within the natural
compass of the liberty of the press to discuss in a decent and temperate manner the decisions and judgments of a court of justice;
to suggest error and, provided it be done in the language, and,
with the view of fair criticism, to censure what is apparently
wrong, but with the limitation that no false or dishonest motive
be assigned to any party. 4 This power may be regulated by the
legislature, but cannot be destroyed, or so far diminished as to be
rendered ineffectual.
Blackstone defines contei~pt in "speaking or writing contemptuously of the courts or judges acting in their judicial capacity, by.
printing false accounts of causes pending in judgment, and by anything in short that demonstrated a gross want of that regard and
respect, which when the courts of justice are deprived of their
authority is entirely lost among the people.' '"4 There are two
species, direct contempt, that is such as is committed in the presence of the court, and indirect contempt, that is such as is not committed in the presence of the court, and the offender must be
brought before the court by a rule or some other sufficient process.
Both of these forms of contempt are punishable by the court
in the same manner by summary proceedings.
There is a reasonable jealousy felt by the public with respect
to the exercise of the summary power to punish for contempt.
Especially is this true as .to contempts which consist in scandalizing the courts. There is a natural apprehension that personal
consideration may influence the court, and bias its judgment.
It is, indeed, a delicate matter, and one with respect to which
the courts should act with the utmost caution and reserve. But
while the duty is a delicate one, it is one which cannot be shirked,
and the faithful discharge of which is essential to the admin48
istration of justice.
The common law theory has always been that an injunction will
not be granted to restrain a threatened publication of a libellous
nature.47 This refusal is based on three very firm grounds. First,
equity protects property interests only, not interests of personality.
4A State of West Virginia v. Frew and Hart, 24 W. Va. 416
45 BLACKSTONE CoMMvNTARIES, Vol. 4, 285.

(1884).

4S State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 (1856).
41

Brandix v. Lance, 8 Paige 47 (N. Y.).
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Second, if equity should act, there would be a denial of the right
of trial by jury. Third, with the Blackstonian interpretation of
our constitutional guarantee in mind-that liberty of the press
prohibits only previous censorship or restraint-the writ of injunction would amount to nothing other than a power of censorship, a species of restraint, exercised by the court of equity in the
face of the law which has always sought to protect one from such
restraint.
There are certain exceptions laid down where equity will act to
restrain the issuance of a threatened publication. 48 The constitutional guarantees do not protect the liberty to intimidate by
speech or writing. It can be seen here that equity is acting,
not to effect an abridgment of the constitutional rights of free
speech and liberty of the press, but really is seeking to prevent
intimidation. It has been held that the constitutional provision
did not protect a creditor in the power to compel a debtor to
pay a just debt by publishing that it was unpaid, and injuriously
affecting the debtor's credit.4 9
A number of cases allow an injunction to issue where the
writing or publication is part of a wrong which would be enjoined
by itself. One will note on a careful examination of the cases
where injunctions are issued to restrain such threatened publication of libel, there is really some other element in the case that
would afford equity sufficient grounds to act, and the libellous matter is so entwined and entangled with the other injurious element that the court will not undertake, nor would it
be possible to separate it but will enjoin the entire thing. An
excellent illustration of this is the celebrated Gomper's contempt
case in which the court held, in enjoining publications of libellous
matters, that freedom of the press was not involved since the
It
publication was but an incident of the unlawful conspiracy."
has been held in Texas, seemingly without serious effort on part
of the court, that the defendant, in a suit for the alienation of the
affection of the plaintiff's wife, may be enjoined from speaking
or writing to the wayward wife, in spite of the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of speech.51 Here again, the court, in issuing the restraining order, was justified since the alienation of
the wife's affection was the thing to be prevented. The fact that
communications were the means whereby this wrong would be
43 29 HARVARD LAW RaviEw 640.
'o State v. McCabe. 135 Mo. 450, 37 S. W. 123 (1896).
Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911).
Ex parte Wartield, 40 Tex. Criminal 413, 50 S. W. 933 (1899).
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accomplished, justified the court in enjoining them as part and
parcel of the wrong done the plaintiff.
Obviously, there is no question but that the writ of injunction
will not lie unless the matter involved be written. It is impossible
to deal with belief which is an internal matter, entirely controlled
by moral law. Such beliefs can be dealt with legally only when
manifested externally in some tangible form.
It is now well to reiterate that which was stated at the outset
of this discussion: cases involving the right of freedom of speech
and liberty of the press arise with greater frequency in times of
national distress and disturbance than in times of normalcy. It is
well known to the student of American History that, since the
formation of our government, there have been four eras of great
national disorder; the period about 1798 when the teachings of
the French Revolutionists threatened our country; the War of
1812; the Civil War; and the recent World War. To the student
of American legal history, it is well known, that the greatest
amount of litigation, and so-called restraints involving the right
of free speech and liberty of the press have occurred in these
very same trying times. The only apparent reason for this is as
Mr. Justice Holmes stated, "the right of free speech is not an
absolute unchanging thing. War does make a difference."5 2 When
a nation has definitely committed itself to war, or when its existence is threatened, all principles of normal internal order may
be suspended. As property may be taken and corporal service
may be conscripted, so liberty of speech may be limited or suspended, so far as deemed needful for the prosecution of war.
The normal rights to life, liberty and property are certainly no less
important than the normal right to expression of opinion."'
The recent world war affords excellent examples of socalled
governmental interference with freedom of speech. The Federal
Espionage Act, passed in 1917, has been the center around which
have raged bitter controversies concerning the constitutional guarantees now in question.54 Since the repeal of the Sedition Laws
of 1798, there has been no like statute except in so far as the
Espionage Act may be so considered. This act has been held
constitutional, the court applying the Blackstonian Theory, that
The court
no preliminary license requirement was imposed.5
could have attained the same result on the ground that such utterances, as were forbidden by the Act, were crimes at common law,

= Schenck v.

United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
14 ILu LAw RaviEw 539.
ACTS JuNB 1917, Oh. 30 Title I, 3;

W.

VA ACTS, Ch. 143, § 1.

U. S. v. Pierce, 245 Fed. 878 (1917).
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and therefore never within the meaning of the freedom guaranteed
by the Constitution. This is but an instance, under the general
rule universally accepted, that the constitutional guarantees of free
speech afford no protection to acts which, at common law, were
crimes.
One can well remember the bombastic outcries indulged in by
the radical press of our nation during the period of the World
War, the howls raised over the imprisoning of certain men who
gave vent to their "innocent and harmless" beliefs. In war
times, the nervous tension of the nation is raised to a considerable
higher pitch than in ordinary times of peace. Hence, words in
themselves perfectly harmless in peace time, will, in times of
national excitement, bring about the "substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Thus, a man who goes into a public
market to discuss the Nation's errors, incites his auditors to commit violence, and thus brings himself within the purview of the
act. It is not the words that are punished in such a case, but
an action in which the words are employed. The liability is not
to be found in the words as words, but in their tendency to produce an evil specified by Congress in the statute, such as interference with the fighting forces of the nation.
It has been held that aliens do not come within the protection
of the Constitutional guarantees of free speech and liberty of the
press. The courts, in arriving at this conclusion, state that the
rights are conferred only on citizens. Whatever may be the merits
of the argument, which are based on the assumption that aliens
should share these rights as being within the spirit although not
within the letter of the First Amendment and the bills of rights
of the different states, however, the Fourteenth Amendment, in
regard to due process and equal protection of the laws, should
protect the alien from the above discriminatory action. It is well
settled that these clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to
aliens as well as citizens.58
Here is the proper place to set limits to this discussion. The
decisions of our courts, both state and federal, have followed, in
an almost unbroken chain, the interpretation of this constitutional
right laid down by Blackstone-that freedom of the press as guaranteed by the constitutions should be construed as imposing no
previous restraints upon publications, but not exempting one from
subsequent punishment for publications as may be deemed contrary to public welfare.57 It is to be hoped that the courts will
M
State v. Montgomery,
7 Patterson v. colorado,

94 Maine 192, 47 AtI. 165 (1900).
205 U. S. 454 (1907).
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not abandon this traditional doctrine, which may be termed "let
the speaker beware," where the speaker's liability is determined
by a jury. It will be for the jury at last to define the boundaries
of this liberty, and in their hands the matter may safely rest.
While definition may be difficult, it is not hard to distinguish between honest "criticism and vituperation, between loyal protest
The jury is drawn from the people, and their
and sedition."
opinion may be considered representative of public opinion in
general. Thus in each case as it arises, the jury will define from
the existing standards the freedom of speech, and with the constant changes of conditions and of pubilc sentiment, we may
expect corresponding changes of opinion as to what may or may
not be lawfully published.
Dire results would follow the adoption of what may be termed
the "laissez-faire" theory of speech, a "free trade" in ideas as
suggested in a recent case. We are living in a practical world, not
in a Utopia where such theories would cause no harn and problems.
The safeguarding and fructification of free and constitutional
institutions is the very basis and mainstay upon which the freedom
of the press and speech rests, and that freedom, therefore does not
and cannot be held to include the right, virtually, to destroy such
institutions. It suffices to say that however complete is the freedom of speech to state, publish things and discuss them, that
right as every other right enjoyed in human society, is subject to
restraints which separate right from wrong.' 9 Even the most
liberal advocates of this right will join with us in stating that
speech uncontrolled in the mouth of a demagogue, in the time
of a nation's disturbance, is as dangerous as firearms in the hands
of a maniac, and this right should be controlled by the same common law as the mnaniae is controlled.
Abrams v. United States, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 81, 250 U. S. 616 (1919).
Toledo Newspaper Co. v. U. S.,219 U. S. 420 (1917).
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